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During most of Steve Job’s tenure as CEO of Apple Inc. the company did not have any long-term debt obligations.
Apple started an aggressive buyback program only after Tim Cook took over, simultaneously adding debt to its
capital structure. Coincidentally, San Francisco, where Steve Jobs was born, experienced more disaster-related
fatalities during Jobs’ formative years than Tim Cook’s birthplace of Mobile, Alabama. This anecdote illustrates our
primary hypothesis that personal experience of traumatic events shapes how a person views financial risk-taking.
A manager’s ability to assess and cope with risk has pervasive effects on corporate decision-making and CEOs are
arguably among the most influential corporate decision-makers. Across several corporate policies and a diverse set
of formative events, there is a growing consensus that past life experiences affect CEOs’ attitudes toward risk. For
example, CEOs that grew up during the Great Depression tend to be more conservative in their debt borrowing. In
our paper, we explore whether early-life experiences of natural disasters can affect how CEOs handle risk.
Early-life exposure to the consequences of environmental risk may either increase or decrease a CEO’s risk-taking
behaviour. CEOs with exposure to fatalities from natural disasters may be more sensitized to the consequences of
risk, and therefore be wary of decisions that increase firm risk. However, it is also plausible that childhood exposure
to natural disasters may give the CEOs experience in dealing with risky situations and increase their confidence
when making decisions involving firm risk. Hence, it is not immediately obvious how exposure to natural disasters
affects subsequent CEO behaviour. We hypothesize that the relationship is in fact, non-linear, that CEOs with
disaster experience that is not significantly fatal develop a higher risk tolerance, whereas those with exposure to
major fatal disasters would be sensitized to the negative consequences of risk and therefore tend to behave more
conservatively.
To test this conjecture, we examine the relation between CEO early-life exposure to fatal disasters and subsequent
corporate financial and investment policies adopted by the firms that employ the CEOs. We assemble a dataset of
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about 1,700 US-based CEOs, their birthplaces, birth year, and any disasters that occurred in their birth county five to
fifteen years after their birth. Under the assumption that the CEOs remained in their birth counties for the first fifteen
years of their life, we then analyze how the disaster experience is related to a variety of firm policies related to risk-
taking, like carrying long-term debt, stock return volatility, conducting acquisitions, and not holding a lot of cash.
We find that those CEOs with “moderate” exposures to disaster-related fatalities are more likely to be tolerant to firm
risk-taking: they are more likely to engage in acquisitions, their firms hold more debt and less cash as a percentage
of assets, and their stock returns are more volatile. In contrast, those CEOs with “extreme” exposures tend to be
more cautious in their risk-taking based on these outcomes.
Recent medical research suggests a possible mechanism underlying these patterns. First, neuroscience and
epigenetics studies indicate that adverse experiences affect subsequent behaviour at least partly due to permanent
physiological and biological changes in the brain. Second, evolutionary biologists argue that biological systems with
an original function commonly adapt to different functions, a phenomenon known as ‘co-option’. Hence, if brain
development and function are physiologically altered by trauma, it is plausible that the brain functions affected by
non-economic risk may be subsequently co-opted to deal with economic risk.
This is not to suggest that one should relocate in a disaster-prone area in order to raise a future CEO. CEOs are
actually no more likely to have experienced a disaster or a disaster-related fatality than the average American. The
ability of an individual to overcome disaster and rise to the ranks of a CEO is something we do not explore in this
current study. However, our findings do suggest that boards and search committees should take into account the
early-life experiences of candidates when determining whether the future CEO’s attitudes towards various corporate
policies are a good fit with the needs of the company.
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Notes:
This blog post appeared first on Columbia University Law School’s Sky Blog and is based on  the authors’
paper What Doesn’t Kill You Will Only Make You More Risk-Loving: Early-Life Disasters and CEO Behavior ,
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